granted state licenses (White, 1978) . This movement has not engendered unconditional surpon. Existent and proposed legislation have come under the scrutiny of such government agencies as the Federal Trade Commission and the Depanment of Health, Education, and Welfare as well as groups and agencies concerned with accountability and consumer benefit (Shapiro, 1976) .
That consumer protection from inept or unqualified health professionals is imronanr is inarguable. The determination of how this can best be accomplished, however, is another marrero Questions are asked about the need for and the effectiveness and cost-benefit ratio of licensing at the state level. Other mer hods of credentialing are already at work before a state license comes into effect, for instance, accreditation of education programs and, for some rrofessions, a national examination. Miller (1982) asked, "How many checks are needed to determine an individual's abilities'" (p. 33). Additionally, these credentialing mechanisms offer a degree of uniformity that is absent with state licensing.
Wilma West rcponed in 1976 that evidence that consumer protection is served bl' licensing laws was not borne out by the research. Audet (1985) reponed on a comparison of the performance of X-ray technologists in licensed and unlicensed Slates. This study, completed in 1976 by the American Society of Radiologic Technologists and the American College of Radiology, found "no definite differences in radiation protection practices between the licensure and the nonlicensure states" (Audet, 1985, r 273) Not only is there a lack of documentation of consumer protecrion, but also, there is evidence of professional self-serving, Roemer (1980) stated, "In the opinion of many, licensing laws, originally designed to protect the public against quackery, commercial exrloitation, deception, and professional incompetence, had failed to do so and instead protecred professionals from too much competition" (p. 183). Miller (1982) quoted a member of a California state agency who noted that demands for licensing bills invariably come from professional groups rather than from consumers demanding protection. Stackpole (1978) acknowledged a component of rrofessional self-interest in the licensing of resriratory therapists but insisted that consumer protecrion is the major emphasis Miller (19H2) also addressed the concerns of respiratory therapists who believed that licensing would assist them in receiving thirdpany reimbursement but who also contended "that their rrimary concern is quality of care" (p. 36).
There is amrle evidence that professional licensure has acred instead to increase the COStS of service to the consumer in several ways (Frey, 19H4) . Nichols (19H9) pointed out that Ahhough licensing prorech the public from incompetem and dishonest practitioners, it also restricts freedom of entlY. This dual effect simultaneously proteCtS the puhlic and prOVides a basi> for professional monopoly. (p 63) Education requirements for the attainment of licensure may increase COStS of entering the profession that must be recouped through higher wages. White (1975) What Davy and Peters failed to consider, however, is that by more strictly delineating occupational roles, the costS of specific services deemed to be occupational therapy may be higher in licensed states than in those states without licensure where the same service might be performed by someone other than an occupational therapist.
There are nonmonetary costs to consumers as well in the loss of autonomy in the choice of a health care provider Hazelkorn and ChristOffel (1984) maintained that "underlying the principle of licensure is the assumption that the public cannot judge whether practitioners of the licensed professions are qualified or competent" (p. 105). Because, as Beauchamp and Childress (1983) pointed out, "the health care professionaL ..sometimes has aconception of benefits, harms, and their balance that differs from that of the patient" (p. 168), paternalism has long been a part of health care tradition. Beauchamp and Childress further stated, "To the extent one protects a person from harms produced by causes beyond the person's knowledge and control, the intervention has plausible claim to being morally justified, for the choices are substantially nonvoluntary" (p. 178).
In justifying professional paternalism, Davy and Peters (1982) concluded, "We believe the consumer is not in a position to evaluate the qualifications of an occupational therapist. Most consumers are not familiar with occupational therapy until they have an acute need for our services" (p. 430). The same is probably true of any of the allied health professions. Robert Atchley (1988) , a gerontologiSt at Miami University in Ohio, Stated, From the point of society at large, credentials and licenses are designed to differentiate people who have knowledge and experience in a field from those who do not. ...The need for credentials and licenses stems from the fact that in the anonymous urban society, people can present themselves as being qualified whose performance subsequently indicates they are notsometimes with catastrophic results.
(p 170)
Realistically, it is impossible to provide sufficient information on all allied health services to enable consumers to make informed choices. Besides the volume of information needed, the probability that the consumer will be uninterested in this type of information when not acutely in need of it precludes an effective public education campaign. Although this is adequate justification for a paternalistic intervention to benefit the consumer by protecting him or her from harm that might be done by an unqualified practitioner, it may be outweighed by the more than ample documentation of benefits for the licensed profession and cOStS to the consumer.
The licensing procedure also entails costs to the profession. A cost to professional honesty may derive from inability to establish that consumer protection is the foremost concern of professional groups seeking licensure. The practice of "grandfathering," or granting licenses to those engaged in an occupation at the time legislation goes into effect, can make no claim for consumer protection. It serves only to prevent opposition to passage of licensure legislation (Nichols, 1989 The imposition of such external forces puts allied health professions in the position of taking action in order to survive, even if such action seems contralY to consumer interests. This is justifiable if we believe that the consumer ultimately benefits from the availability of the discipline. This benefit must be of sufficient magnitude to justify increased economic costs to the consumer to ensure the survival and availability of the profession's services.
Perhaps another factor is the prohibition on advertising and public announcements of costs of service, which were traditionally a part of professional codes of ethics (Gaumer, 1984) There may be further costs to professional integrity in terms of policing performance of members of the profession. A5 Stackpole (1978) pointed out, professional organizations control licensing boards, This puts them at risk for effectively dealing with disciplinary actions. Even though many license statutes require consumer representation on licensing boards, the persons appointed must have some interest in the profession. The appointment process may mask the role of the professional organization in identifying consumers to be selected, but it would be naive to believe that state officials who make ap· pointments do so without input from those concerned.
Although licensing of allied health prufessionals may seem to have fallen short of stated intent and, in many instances, seems to increase consumer costs without documented correspond· ing benefits, this is a somewhat simplistic and misleading appraisal. It is easier to quantify the negative aspects of li· censing in economic terms than to do so with any positive features. It is difficult, if not impossible, to place economic value on the safety inherent in being treated by a practitioner with at least minimum competency. Even a title act provides some protection in that a person cannot publicly refer to himself or herself as a practitioner of a professiun without minimum qualifications. There is incalculable, if unrecognized, value to the consumer in the assurance that an identified health care professional has met some minimum standards of preparation for practice. The consumer is relieved of the neceSSity of gathering information on the provider's competency.
Carson (1991) identified three characteristics of a profession: "Demonstrated mastery of a branch of knowl·
The American .Journal oj Occupational Therapy edge, the use of that knowledge in the service of society and its members, [and] self-regulation of professional conduct" (p. 87). Licensure laws can be the means by which these characteristics are sustained in practice. Credentialing mechanisms must be suffiCiently rigorous to demonstrate acqUisition of a minimum body of knowledge. A major complaint against licensing laws has been that they "generally regulated only initial qualifications to practice" (Roemer, 1980, p. 183) . To improve consumer protection, a number of states and professions considered inclusion of recredentialing mechanisms into their licensing laws, The intent of such modifications to licensing laws was to "remove those practitioners who are no longer competent to practice or place these practitioners on probation with supervision until they have regained the necessary competencies" (Gray, 1984, p,23).
More importantly, we must proVide public documentation of our commitment to quality care. We cannot rely on unsubstantiated claims of consumer protection and benefit; there is tOo much evidence to the contrary, Through both professional groups and state licensing agencies, we have the potential to monitOr and document successful consumer protection. Our enforcemcnt must concentrate not only on preventing non -occu pational therapists from claiming to practice occupational therapy, but also on weeding out incompetent practitioners from our own ranks.
Vigorous investigation and enforcement must be documented and publicized. We cannot claim consumer protection without identifying for cunsumers those persons who act in ways that compromise care. The time for protecting the identity of the person against whom a complaint has been lodged is prior to hearings or board actions. This is consistent with principles of due process in our legal system. We are obligated, however, to publicize the findings of hearings when a therapist is found to be in violation.
There is no reason to pass licensing laws if funding for licensing agencies is not sufficient to permit investigation of cum plaints and action against incompetent practitioners. Practitioners must be Willing to pay licensing fees that are sufficient to proVide funds for investigation and enforcement of regulations. AJ· though such funding may add to health care costs, rigorous enforcement is nec· essary if licensing laws are to have the desired effect of assuring consumers of competent practitioners. Inadequate funding actually results in waste.
It is more eqUitable to have the COStS of licensing health care professionals borne by all, that is, potential as well as current consumers, by tax revenues. However, as White (1979) pointed out, the general public is most likely to organize to resist tax increases. Politi· cians and policymakers exhibit more concern about direct government expenditure for licensing than about broader economic effects, such as costs indirectly passed on to consumers, This makes it all the more necessary for occupational therapists to publicly docu· ment the benefits of the expenditure of funds for self-policing. Efforts to repeal licensing acts on the basis of their lack of effective consumer protection can occur in any state (Lynch, 1988) .
We need not apologize for the benefits that our profession accrues from licensing laws, We have valuable services to offer. If our continued existence depends on legal definitions afforded by licensing laws, so be it. However, our professional obligation must extend beyond the provision of quality care in our own practices to support for the consumer protection practices of our regulatory agencies. This support may be in any of several forms: Willingness to pay licensing fees that are adequate to fund investigations and interventions, willingness to assist with investigative procedures, attention to the activities of state legislators, and insistence that information on violations of licensing regulations be made available to the public. •
